

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DRAFTING GROUP MEETING NO. 201, MARCH 21, 1978
(SALT TWO - 1664)

SUMMARY: DISCUSSIONS CONTINUED ON CRUISE MISSILE RANGE
DEFINITION. PEREZ REAFFIRMED U.S. VIEW THAT ALL
ELEMENTS, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, OF CRUISE MISSILE
SYSTEM MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. KARPOV REFUTED U.S.
POSITION AT LENGTH, AND ADDED THAT SOVIET DELEGATION "WAS
NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS" ANY CRUISE MISSILE RANGE
DEFINITION WHICH INCLUDED "COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF CRUISE
MISSILES" AMONG ITS CRITERIA. RESPONDING TO U.S. STATE-
MENTS ON RANGE OF CURRENTLY-DEPLOYED SOVIET CRUISE
MISSILES AT LAST DRAFTING GROUP MEETING, KARPOV ASSERTED
THAT SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES "CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT
VIOLATE THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE IS READY
TO ASSUME." END SUMMARY.

1. PEREZ RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS WHICH KARPOV POSED AT
PRECEDING DRAFTING GROUP MEETING (SALT TWO - 1662). HE
SAID U.S. HAD CITED EXTERNAL RADARS AS BUT ONE EXAMPLE
OF AN EXTERNAL ELEMENT WHICH COULD LIMIT EFFECTIVE RANGE

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OF CRUISE MISSILE. ALL ELEMENTS OF CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM
IN STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT WHEN DETERMINING RANGE. US BELIEVES THAT WHATEVER
ELEMENT, EITHER EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, OR COMBINATION
THEREOF, DETERMINES MAXIMUM DISTANCE AT WHICH A TARGET
CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ATTACKED IS THAT ELEMENT, OR ELEMENTS,
OF THE SYSTEM WHICH WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN

ESTABLISHING THE RANGE OF THE CRUISE MISSILE.

2. KARPOV REBUTTED AT GREAT LENGTH U.S. POSITION ON CRUISE MISSILE RANGE. HE STATED CM RANGE SHOULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF THOSE PROPERTIES INHERENT WITHIN THE MISSILE ITSELF. HE ALLEGED THIS WAS WHAT WAS AGREED "AT HIGHEST LEVEL" WHEN 600-KM AND 2500-KM RANGE LIMITS AGREED UPON. THE DELEGATIONS HAD BEEN "CHARGED" TO DEFINE CM RANGE AS SUCH, NOT "COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS" OF CMS; SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH U.S. SIDE, AND WOULD NOT DO SO.

3. PEREZ ASSERTED U.S. DEFINITION OF CM RANGE IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT USG CONSIDERS TO HAVE BEEN AGREED ON THAT SUBJECT. HE BELIEVED SOVIET DEFINITION TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO ARBITRARILY LIMIT CM RANGE BY FORCING CM TO FLY IN STRAIGHT LINE IN ORDER TO REACH TARGET AT AGREED RANGES. THIS WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH NATURE OF MODERN CMS. IN FACT, IT TENDED TO DISTORT THE CM RANGE DEFINITION.

4. KARPOV DISAGREED, ASSERTING CM CAN FLY Laterally OR VERTICALLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET DEFINITION, BUT THAT SUCH MANEUVERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. DISTANCE BETWEEN LAUNCH-POINT AND TARGET IS, HOWEVER, NOT THE DETERMINING FACTOR, BUT RATHER THE PROJECTION OF THE
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FLIGHT-PATH ONTO THE EARTH'S SURFACE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE VERTICAL MANEUVERS ARE LIKELY TO GREATLY AFFECT CM RANGE, IN CONTRAST TO HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS. WHEN VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS ARE PROJECTED ON EARTH'S SURFACE, THE RESULTS WILL BE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT, "BUT THAT'S NATURAL."

5. REPLYING TO U.S. STATEMENT AT PRECEDING DRAFTING GROUP MEETING (SALT TWO - 1662) THAT UNDER SOVIET CM RANGE DEFINITION, A NUMBER OF CURRENTLY-DEPLOYED SOVIET CMS WOULD HAVE RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KM, KARPOV STATED: "UNDER OUR DEFINITION, THOSE CRUISE MISSILES THE SOVIET SIDE NOW HAS CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT VIOLATE THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE IS READY TO ASSUME."

6. NEXT MEETING TUESDAY, MARCH 28. EARLE

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